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Abstract
The present essay addresses Paul Helm’s most recent attempt to assimilate the thought
of such Reformed scholastics as Francis Turretin to the ‘compatibilism’ of Jonathan
Edwards. Helm has misunderstood a series of important scholastic distinctions concerning the relationship of intellect and will in the older faculty psychology, and the
relationship of foundational or, as I identified it, ‘root’ indifference in the will to its multiple potencies. He has, accordingly, failed to register how Reformed orthodox understandings of free choice outlined in recent scholarship affirm both a simultaneity or
synchronicity of potencies or capacities of the will and a diachronicity of actual effects
and events. The Reformed orthodox writers certainly thought that human freedom was
not incompatible with the divine determination of all things—their resolution of the
issue does not, however, coincide with modern compatibilism.

Keywords
compatibilism – contingency – freedom – will – free choice – synchronic – Helm –
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Traditional Reformed thought on the relationship between the divine will and
human freedom has often been identified as a form of determinism that disallows human freedom, reduces human beings to mere automatons, and fails
to account for human responsibility. Early modern Reformed thinkers, during both the Reformation of the early sixteenth century and the era of postReformation orthodoxy, vigorously opposed what they took to be an accusation
of Stoic fatalism and insisted that they could, in fact, account for human freedom and responsibility while at the same time arguing a divine willing of all
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things. The debate continues into the twenty-first century, with ‘libertarian’ or
‘Arminian’ writers excoriating ‘Calvinists’ for their determinism and Calvinists
responding, one might say almost paradoxically, by confessing a form of determinism, namely ‘compatibilism,’ while at the same time insisting on a form of
human freedom. Recent scholarship has added a significantly different dimension to the debate by looking more deeply into the complex distinctions made
by early modern Reformed scholastics and arguing that a case can be made that
this scholastic theology, in common with several lines of argument inherited
from the medievals, found an alternative way of framing the issues of divine
and human willing that is quite distinct from the modern patterns of argument. This alternative way of framing the issue of necessity, contingency, and
freedom both affirms the divine willing of all things over against libertarianism
and argues the case for alternativity in human willing over against the compatibilist reduction of freedom to a view of the will as uncoerced but determined
to one and only one effect. This new line of scholarship has been disputed at
length by Paul Helm, beginning with his rebuttals of the use of the theory of
synchronic contingency to explicate early Reformed thought on freedom and
contingency.1
In his most recent article,2 Helm has continued his series of essays countering the arguments put forth in the ground-breaking volume Reformed Thought
on Freedom3 and in a significant number of other essays,4 and has specifically
1 E.g., Paul Helm, “Synchronic Contingency in Reformed Scholasticism: A Note of Caution,”
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 57, no. 3 (2003): 207–222; in response to Antonie Vos,
“Scholasticism and Reformation,” in Willem J. van Asselt and Eef Dekker, ed., Reformation and
Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001), 99–119. The response by
Andreas J. Beck and Antonie Vos, “Conceptual Patterns Related to Reformed Scholasticism,”
Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 57, no. 3 (2003): 223–233, was countered by Paul Helm, “Synchronic Contingency Again,”Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 57, no. 3 (2003): 234–238. Note
also Paul Helm. “‘Structural Indifference’ and Compatibilism in Reformed Orthodoxy,” Journal of Reformed Theology 5 (2011): 184–205; “Necessity, Contingency and the Freedom of God,”
Journal of Reformed Theology 8, no. 3 (2014), 243–262; “Jonathan Edwards and the Parting of
the Ways?,” Jonathan Edwards Studies 4, no. 1 (2014), 42–60.; “Francis Turretin and Jonathan
Edwards on Compatibilism,” Journal of Reformed Theology 12 (2018): 335–355; and “Francis
Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Contingency and Necessity,” in Jon Balserak and Richard
Snoddy, eds., Learning from the Past: Essays on Reception, Catholicity and Dialogue in Honour
of Anthony N.S. Lane (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 163–178.
2 Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 335–355.
3 Willem J. van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, trans., ed., and commentary, Reformed
Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in the History of Early-Modern Reformed Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010).
4 E.g., Antonie Vos, “Scotus on Freedom and the Foundation of Ethics: An Utrecht Contribution,” Vivarium 38, no. 2 (2000), 195–196; Andreas J. Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676):
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contested the arguments in my Divine Will and Human Choice that early modern Reformed orthodoxy did not advocate a form of determinism and, quite
specifically, that the Reformed approaches to human free will or free choice
(liberum arbitrium) do not coincide either with modern compatibilism or modern libertarianism.5 The argument originally presented in Reformed Thought on
Freedom indicated that
the distinction between absolute necessity (simpliciter: necessitas consequentis) and relative necessity (secundum quid: necessitas consequentiae)
enabled the Reformed scholastics to point out how necessity and contingency/freedom are in certain respects compatible instead of squarely
contradictory.
Instead, the Remonstrants simplified the issue by their rejection of
the distinction. If necessity and contingency are absolutely opposite, you
are forced to be either a libertarian or a determinist. The Remonstrants
were content to uphold human freedom and were convinced of Reformed
determinism. Yet the Reformed rejected both options as a far too simplistic scheme.6
In rejecting both a determinist or compatibilist and a libertarian reading of
Reformed orthodox thought, the authors of Reformed Thought on Freedom and I
have consistently indicated that the early modern Reformed understood divine
determination to be compatible with human freedom and, accordingly, stand
in a long line of thinkers reaching back to Augustine.7

Basic Features of His Doctrine of God,” in Reformation and Scholasticism, 205–226; Philip
J. Fisk, “Divine Knowledge at Harvard and Yale: From William Ames to Jonathan Edwards,”
Jonathan Edwards Studies 4, no. 2 (2014): 151–178; Fisk, Jonathan Edwards’s Turn from the
Classic-Reformed Tradition of Freedom of the Will (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016);
Hyun-Kwan Kim, “Francis Turretin on Human Free Choice: Walking the Fine Line Between
Synchronic Contingency and Compatibilistic Determinism,” Westminster Theological Journal
79 (2017): 25–44; and Hyun-Kwan Kim, “The Doctrine of Free Choice,” in Mark Jones and
Michael A.G. Haykin, eds., A New Divinity: Transatlantic Reformed Evangelical Debates During the Long Eighteenth Century (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2018), 89–108.
5 Richard A. Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early
Modern Reformed Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2017); Muller, “Jonathan Edwards and the
Absence of Free Choice: A Parting of Ways in the Reformed Tradition,” Jonathan Edwards
Studies 1, no. 1 (2011): 3–22. Note also on Turretin’s doctrine, Carl F. Gobelman, “To Be Free,
or Not to Be Free?: An Analysis and Assessment of Francis Turretin’s Doctrine of Free Will,”
Mid-America Journal of Theology 22 (2011): 129–144.
6 Van Asselt et al., Reformed Thought on Freedom, 38.
7 Cf. Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, 103–105.
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The issue, then, is not about an assumption of compatibility between divine
willing and human freedom in Reformed orthodox thought: Helm, the authors
of Reformed Thought on Freedom, and I stand in agreement on that. There is,
in other words, a formal, albeit superficial, resemblance between modern compatibilism and the older Christian tradition, including the views of the Reformers and the Reformed orthodox. But, as the above quotation from Reformed
Thought on Freedom makes clear, there is also a major difference. This difference appears when a particular theory concerning that compatibility, namely
modern compatibilism, is set in contrast to the nuanced distinctions of the
older Reformed orthodoxy.
Helm continues to assimilate the early modern Reformed teaching to modern compatibilism and, in his most recent essay, claims that my interpretation
assumes “indeterminate freedom of the will” or “indeterminate freedom” and is,
accordingly, “false.”8 In what follows, I dispute that claim and examine Helm’s
objections both to my argumentation and to the approach to synchronic contingency or simultaneous potency in Reformed orthodoxy as pursued both by
me and by the authors of Reformed Thought on Freedom. After a short prologue,
the main body of my response divides into two parts, the first dealing with
Helm’s misconstrual of arguments in my Divine Will and Human Choice and
in Reformed Thought on Freedom, the second with several of the early modern texts in dispute. I leave aside the issue of the interpretation of Jonathan
Edwards’s deterministic approach to free will, as settled in an earlier essay.9

1

The Problem of Modern “isms”

One of the somewhat discomfiting effects of the examination of historical documents on the part of modern theologians and philosophers, particularly when
those documents are pre-Kantian and from the other side of Lessing’s ugly

8 Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 335.
9 Richard A. Muller, “Jonathan Edwards and Francis Turretin on Necessity, Contingency, and
Freedom of Will: In Response to Paul Helm,” Jonathan Edwards Studies 4, no. 3 (2014): 266–
285; note the similar conclusions, to which Helm has not yet responded, in Kim, “Doctrine
of Free Choice,” 104–106; and Fisk, Jonathan Edwards’ Turn, 320–324, 333–341, 415–416, 419,
etc. Fisk has, moreover, quite conclusively documented the philosophical shift at Harvard
that underlies Jonathan Edwards’s failure to grasp the implications of the older Reformed
approach to contingency and freedom: see Fisk, Jonathan Edwards’ Turn, 212–229, in particular 215–216, 219–220, where Fisk documents Harvard Professor Charles Morton’s view of
“moments of nature” or “instants of reason” in a temporal as distinct from a purely logical
sense.
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ditch, is the element of cognitive dissonance that arises from encounter with
ancient, medieval, or early modern terminology. A fairly typical reaction on the
part of theologians and philosophers has been quietly to bypass the dissonance
and assimilate the terminology to modern theories and linguistic conventions.
A good example of this kind of reaction and its problematic result is the modern infliction of a standard of ‘Christocentrism’ on early modern materials.10
A similar problem arises when the modern terminology and conceptual structures of ‘compatibilism’ and ‘libertarianism’ are used in the interpretation of
patristic, medieval, and early modern sources.
The problematic application of this terminology has been noted by various
scholars. At the outset of her study of Anselm on Freedom, Katherin Rogers
indicated that she was about to employ “anachronistic” terminology, notably
‘determinism,’ ‘compatibilism,’ and ‘libertarianism,’ and noted that the terms
“are assigned a variety of meanings and definitions in the contemporary literature.”11 Rogers’s subsequent parsing of the terminology offers a careful and
highly instructive series of differing ways of defining libertarian and compatibilist views leading toward her own application of the terms in the cases of
Augustine and Anselm.12
Alfred Freddoso expresses similar reservations in his treatment of Molina,
noting first that “in modern terms [Molina] is an unremitting libertarian,” but
adding that “we must not conclude … that the dispute between Molinists and
Bañezians … is a precise analog of the contemporary dispute between libertarians and compatibilists,” given that both Molinists and Bañezians both insist
that a free action “is not necessitated by causes operative at times before it takes
place,” namely, causes that belong to “the causal history of the world.”13 Moreover, as Freddoso points out, in the Bañezian formulation, because “God stands
wholly outside the order of created causes,” “God can causally predetermine that
a good effect should be brought about freely by secondary causes.”14 Given
Bañez’s understanding of freedom, his view does not cohere with modern compatibilism. On the other hand, in “the Molinist scheme good contingent effects
are predetermined in that by His middle knowledge God plans for them in detail

10
11
12
13

14

See Richard A. Muller, “A Note on ‘Christocentrism’ and the Imprudent Use of Such Terminology,” Westminster Theological Journal 68 (2006): 253–260.
Katherin Rogers, Anselm on Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 2.
Rogers, Anselm on Freedom, 4–8.
Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge: Part IV of the Concordia, trans. with intro. and
notes by Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 24, 26. 42; hereinafter
cited as Freddoso, “Introduction.”
Freddoso, “Introduction,” 42; Freddoso’s italics.
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and knows that they will ensue given the total causal contribution He has willed
to make to the created world,”15 a conclusion that, arguably, would not sit easily
with modern libertarians.
More recently, Brian Shanley has argued that once a libertarian reading of
Aquinas thought has been ruled out on the ground that Aquinas assumes that
all creaturely operations, including all acts of the human will, are moved by
God as first cause, this conclusion does not render Aquinas a compatibilist “by
default,” inasmuch as in the Thomist view, “God creates us and sustains us in
freedom” and that, according to Aquinas, freedom is “not determined by any
temporally antecedent causal chain.”16
Given that Aquinas’s and Bañez’s accounts of contingency and freedom have
parallels in early modern Reformed writings and that Molina’s account supplied the engine for Arminius’s approach, it should come as no surprise that
neither the Reformed nor Arminius’s view (as distinct from later Remonstrant
argumentation) is easily accommodated to modern compatibilist and libertarian formulations. The problem, then, is not over the compatibility, understood
by the Reformed, of divine will with human freedom; the problem lies with the
attempt to press modern “-isms” into the recalcitrant historical materials. As
the title of Shanley’s essay indicates, there is a view of “created freedom” that is
“beyond libertarianism and compatibilism.”

2

Clarification of Arguments

Much of the debate between Helm and the new scholarship on Reformed
thought on divine will and human freedom arises because of two major differences between the older scholastic patterns of thought and argument and
modern theological and philosophical assumptions. The first of these differences has already been noted in Freddoso’s and Shanley’s comments on the
two levels of causality—the eternal, divine primary causality and the temporal, creaturely secondary causality. In the older scholastic view, both divine and
human willing are necessary to the accomplishment of any human act, neither
by itself is sufficient to explain the act, and both operate freely according to
their respective natures. Indeed, human freedom depends for its very existence

15
16

Freddoso, “Introduction,” 43.
Brian J. Shanley, “Beyond Libertarianism and Compatibilism: Thomas Aquinas on Created
Freedom,” in Richard Velkley, ed., Freedom and the Human Person (Washington: Catholic
University of America Press, 2007), 70–89, here 72, 87, 89.
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on the freedom of the divine will. Loss of this understanding of concurrent
primary and secondary causality leads to an utterly temporalized approach to
cause and effect that merges divine and human causality into one closed system. The second of these differences lies in the scholastic distinctions used
to explain the operation and interrelation of these two levels of causality—
distinctions that once belonged to the common vocabulary of theologians and
philosophers but that ceased to be used as the alternative understandings and
terminology of modern rationalism (whether Cartesian, Spinozistic, or Lockian) took hold in the eighteenth century and as theology and philosophy passed
out of Latin into the vernacular. Loss of the Christian Aristotelian understandings of causality, faculty psychology, necessity and contingency, and the related
vocabulary led to the misunderstanding and disuse of the scholastic resolutions of divine will and human freedom.
Helm’s argument embodies a series of misconceptions concerning both the
early modern Reformed understanding of freedom and my approach to the theory identified as ‘synchronic contingency’ and argued in Reformed Thought on
Freedom. These misconceptions arise largely out of a failure to grasp the basic
distinctions used by scholastics to argue the case for contingency and freedom.
In the first place, Helm improperly describes synchronic contingency as “the
idea that the will is such that the requisites for action A to be performed being
present, an agent has the power to choose either not-A or B at that very moment,
hence ‘synchronic,’” and then comments that one of the strengths of my work
is my rejection of “this novel supposition.”17 Better to identify synchronic contingency as “the idea that the operation of intellect and will is such that the
requisites for choice being present, an agent simultaneously (or synchronically)
has the potencies to choose A; to refuse it, choosing not-A; or to choose B, hence
‘synchronic.’” Once the concept is better defined, it becomes considerably more
understandable, considerably less novel, and, clearly, not rejected by me. My
own criticism, moreover, does not concern the concept as much as the terminology used to characterize it and the historical background to its reception in
the early modern era: the term ‘synchronic contingency’ may be novel, but the
concept it references is not. My preference is to hold, as much as possible, to the
language used by the Reformed orthodoxy, namely ‘simultaneity of potency,’ as
a more precise way of referencing the concept.18
Helm is therefore quite correct in adding that I “find a place for synchronicity” in my “advocacy of the [Reformed orthodox] commitment to multiple

17
18

Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 338, my italics.
Cf. Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, 313–324.
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potencies” and in my disagreement with his claim that the Reformed orthodox are “resolutely diachronic,” which is to say, to the exclusion of any synchronicity.19 The place for synchronicity or simultaneity of potencies is precisely in the assumption of the older faculty psychology held by the Reformed,
that the will simultaneously (or synchronously) has multiple capabilities or
potencies—while the place for diachronicity is in the assumption also held by
the Reformed, as a simple matter of logic, that a person cannot do A and notA at the same time, but both before and after doing A can choose to do not-A.
That person, moreover, can choose either A or not-A because he has potency or
capacity for either and can be identified as free because the resident potency
to choose not-A does not evaporate when a person chooses A: it just cannot be
actualized in the same moment.
On the same issue, Helm is also quite mistaken when he alleges that “Muller
says that there are ‘still multiple potencies’ in sensu composito in the will,” when
the passage that he cited from me only a few pages before has a significantly
different nuance: “there are still multiple potencies in the will and in sensu
diviso (but not in sensu composito) the will, having willed A retains in the same
moment, a non-actualizable potency to not-A.”20 Helm misconstrues my statement and appears to confuse potency or capacity with actuality and operation.
The distinction in sensu diviso/in sensu composito is taken over by the Reformed
orthodox from their medieval predecessors as a syntactical device in analyzing
propositions. As such it relates specifically to potencies as identified in modal
propositions. Accordingly, the divided and composite senses are not different
states or conditions of something, they are logical representations referencing the same state or condition in different ways. In the discussion of human
willing, the divided sense references potencies or capacities, the composite
sense references the operation and actuality. Thus, with reference to potencies
or capacities, the Reformed orthodox assume, in the divided sense, that there
are multiple capacities that always belong to the will and that remain resident
when one of them has been actualized. In the composite sense, namely, with
reference to operation and actuality, the exercise of one capacity rules out the
simultaneous exercise of a contrary or contradictory capacity, but not the existence of that capacity.
Helm’s statement in the same paragraph that “for Muller, in the interval
[between a completed action and the next choice of the intellect] the will has
19
20

Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 339.
Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 351, with the mistake
repeated on 355; cf. Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, 251, 292, 294, 299, et passim;
with Reformed Thought on Freedom, 193–194.
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to remain in a state sufficient to preserve contingency in the agent and to negate
compatibilism”21 also rather misses the point: the early modern Reformed
assume that a finite agent is by nature contingent and that its choices are contingent. In scholastic terminology, these contingencies are necessities of the
consequence or necessities of the present, namely, that something must be
what it is when it is, even though it could be otherwise. In the case of acts of
will, the reason that the act could be otherwise is simply that the free will—
according to the Reformed orthodox—has the capability to have done and to
do the contrary. Helm’s statement also has the distinctly odd implication that
“between a completed action and the next choice of the intellect” the state of
the will does not preserve contingency, yielding a will that was contingent prior
to the choice, is no longer contingent after the choice, and then becomes rather
magically contingent again in order to make a subsequent choice, after which
it will no longer be contingent, and so forth. Or perhaps he is simply denying
the contingency of willing.
Helm is also quite incorrect to interpret my argument as indicating contingency in the world order “considered from the human level, but no contingency
when viewed from the viewpoint of the all-encompassing divine decree.”22
Helm’s mistake here rests on a confusion of necessity with an absence of contingency. In early modern Reformed thought, there are different kinds of necessity: absolute necessity does rule out contingency, but hypothetical necessity,
necessity of the consequence, the necessity of the present, necessity of certainty, and necessity of infallibility do not rule out contingency. As indicated
in numerous places in my argument, the Reformed orthodox affirmed contingency at both levels of causality, primary and secondary.23 There are contingencies by divine decree, God being free to will otherwise and being able
by his premotion to act in and with secondary causes to bring about contingent effects. These effects, albeit contingent, are nonetheless characterized by
a necessity of infallibility on God’s part that corresponds with the necessity
of the consequence at the human level: as willed freely in both the primary
and the secondary causality they are contingent, as existent they are necessary

21
22
23

Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 355.
Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 337.
See Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, 129, 131, 137, 194–196, 201–203, 212–214, 270–
271, et passim; and Muller, “Jonathan Edwards and Francis Turretin,” 275. Also see Richard
A. Muller, “Absolute and Relative; Unconditioned with Conditions; Necessary, Free, and
Contingent: Reviewing the Reformed Scholastic Understanding of God,” in R. Scott Clark
and Joel E. Kim, eds., Always Reforming: Essays in Honor of W. Robert Godfrey’s 65th Birthday (Escondido: Westminster Theological Seminary, 2010), 56–73, here 61, 64–66.
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inasmuch as they must be what they are, and as known by God they are known
necessarily as contingencies. In other words, the Reformed hold that contingent things necessarily eventuate contingently by reason of the divine decree.
There is an absolute necessity that the entire world order be grounded in the
divine will or decree, given that from the Aristotelian perspective of the early
modern Reformed, there can be no motion or action on the part of finite creatures that is not grounded in the willing of God as first mover or first cause.
This necessity of a prior, eternal divine willing provides the foundation not
only for necessary events in the world order but also for contingent and free
events and acts. The contingency and freedom of events and acts in the world
order arises both from the first cause and from the second causes. When God
wills the motions and acts of all things, he wills that they act according to their
natures—and the free agents act freely, having full exercise of their liberties of
contradiction and contrariety in the same moment that their acts or motions
are willed by God. God always wills freely, and the existence of the entire world
order is contingent upon the divine will. The foundation of contingent and free
acts in the order of second causality is the freedom of God in the primary order
of causality. Indeed, the point is, as the Westminster Confession states, that
God’s decree establishes the contingencies in the world order as contingent, the
free acts as free, and the necessary events as necessary.24 This, in my reading,
does not correspond either with modern libertarian or modern compatibilist
theories.

3

Examining Some Early Modern Texts

An underlying difference between Helm’s reading of the early modern sources
and my interpretation has to do with the way in which distinctions between primary and secondary actuality (actus primus and actus secundus) and between
the simultaneity of potency (simultas potentiae) and the potency of simultaneity (potentia simultatis) are understood. Helm cites Samuel Willard’s summary
of the issue:
How far there is an Indifference to be acknowledged in the Will, respecting
Voluntary actions, needs not be curiously discussed; only we may observe,
that though there may such a thing be allowed to the Will, in actu primo,
24

Westminster Confession of Faith, iii.1; v.2, in Philip Schaff, ed., The Creeds of Christendom,
with a History and Critical Notes, 3 vols., 6th ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983),
3:608, 612.
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which the Schools call Simultas potentiae, by vertue whereof the Will,
according to its own nature, is capable of acting or not acting, or acting
thus or contrarily; and is capable of acting thus now, and is afterwards
capable of revoking that act; nay indeed, this is the root of the liberty of
the Will. Nevertheless, in actu secundo, which the Schools call Potentia
Simultatis, which is in the Wills applying it self to its act, it doth not then
act Indifferently, but upon choice, by which it is Determined.25
Helm concludes that in the “last sentence” of the quotation, where Willard indicates the absence of a potency of simultaneity in the will’s operation or second
actuality (in actu secundo), “there is no suggestion … of resident potencies.”26
Quite true. But in the preceding sentence, multiple potencies are not merely
suggested, they are precisely referenced, namely, simultas potentiae as defined
by Willard as the simultaneous presence of capabilities of acting or not acting
in the will’s primary actuality (in actu primo).
The presence of resident potencies is also quite apparent in Turretin’s distinction between a simultaneity of potencies in the divided sense with no
potency for simultaneity in the composite sense.27 Willard’s and Turretin’s
point is not that there is a temporal sequence from the divided to the composite
sense but that in any given moment, there is in the divided sense a simultaneity of potencies to multiple effects while there is also, and necessarily so, no
potency for simultaneity in the composite sense. Willard also identifies indifference in actu primo as the “root of the liberty of the Will.” In other words,
potencies to do otherwise are resident, but incapable of actualization at the
same time as their contraries and contradictories. The distinction is relevant
to the issue of free choice inasmuch as the presence of the potency or capacity to do otherwise is evidence that the choice or act of election is genuinely
free.

25

26
27

Samuel Willard, A Brief Reply to Mr George Kieth, in Answer to a Script of His, Entituled,
A Refutation of a Dangerous and Hurtfull Opinion, Maintained by Mr. Samuel Willard, &c.
(Boston: Samuel Phillips, 1703), 15; cf. the quotation and analysis of the passage in Muller,
Divine Will and Human Choice, 290–291. Willard is responding to George Keith, Refutation
of a Dangerous & Hurtful Opinion Maintained by Mr. Samuel Willard … Viz, That the Fall
of Adam, and All the Sins of Men, Necessarily Come to Passe by Virtue of Gods Decree (New
York: s.n., 1702).
Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 353.
Francis Turretin, Institutio theologiae elencticae, in qua status controversiae perspicue exponitur, praecipua orthodoxorum argumenta proponuntur, & vindicantur, & fontes solutionum
aperiuntur, 3 vols. (Geneva: Samuel de Tournes, 1679–1685), VIII.i.8; X.iii.4.
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Here Helm seems to read the distinction between actus primus and actus
secundus as a temporal or diachronic sequence, as if the actus primus is succeeded and replaced by the actus secundus,28 perhaps because he understands
actus as “action” rather than as “actuality.” But the primary actuality of the faculties, intellect and will, is simply what they are and must be, including all of
their potencies or capacities, prior and foundational to any operation of thinking or willing: what is diachronic is the movement to operation and the ongoing
operation that is the secondary actuality. What is synchronic or simultaneous is the presence of potencies that identify contradictories and contraries
of which the will is capable. In other words, the primary actuality of a faculty
is not removed in act or operation of the will. The exercise or actualization of
a potency removes neither the potency itself nor the other resident, nonactualized potencies of the faculty. Willard also adds that this freedom of will
or choice is such that “not the understanding, nor the will in the man, but
the whole man is a free cause.”29 A free cause, by definition, is a cause that
is not determined to one effect, a point that Helm does not take duly into
consideration. His “resolutely diachronic” reading of freedom leaves the will,
to borrow Shanley’s phrase, “determined by [a] temporally antecedent causal
chain.”
Helm is quite opposed to my argument that “follow” does not indicate a
causal necessity or command in the Reformed writers’ statement that the will
must follow the last judgment of the practical intellect. He comments, “Muller
suggests that the ‘must follow’ is a matter of order, not of command or compulsion” and concludes that, according to my interpretation, “The act of will,
in other words, does not follow the judgment of the intellect.” As if ‘follow’ ”
can only mean to have been caused by an antecedent. Quite to the contrary,
Turretin’s use of the Latin sequor allows for a range of meaning, as also does
the English ‘follow’: follow, come after, attend, succeed to, ensue, accede to, or
come next in order. Helm’s conclusion is therefore a bit of a non sequitur.
Turretin and others of the Reformed distinguish the faculties of intellect and
will without separating them into two things or realities. Intellect and will are
conjoined. Their distinction is extrinsic and made with reference to the object
as judged and chosen.30 Rational necessity is not causal necessity: the ‘rational

28
29
30

Note that this mistake parallels the arguments that Jonathan Edwards would have encountered at Harvard: see Fisk, Jonathan Edwards’ Turn, 215–216, 219–220.
Willard, Brief Reply to Mr George Kieth, 15.
Turretin, Institutio, X.i.5; cf. Muller Divine Will and Human Choice, 252; and note also 247
on Voetius.
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necessity’ of the intellect determining an object does not impede freedom of
will. Rather, it serves to define how the will that “cannot not follow [non possit
non sequi]” such a determination can still remain free: the will is a rational faculty that cannot proceed without knowing an object.31 It belongs to the nature
of the two faculties that the intellect produces rational judgments and the elective act of will, as rational, follows upon rational judgments. Not only is it the
case that sequor does not necessarily indicate a causal sequence, but Turretin
also does not exactly say “must follow” (Helm’s italics, implying a causal necessity)32—Turretin, literally rendered, says “cannot not follow” or “not able not to
follow,” which simply from a grammatical point of view lacks the causal implication of “must follow.”
Turretin, unfortunately, does not offer a definition of “follow” or offer a full
explanation of the interrelationship of the faculties. He does, however, provide
enough detail in his discussion of necessities to rule out Helm’s position. After
describing which kinds of necessity remove freedom and which kinds do not,
Turretin also identifies the kinds of freedom that belong to the will, namely,
liberty of contrariety and liberty of contradiction. He places these liberties in
the will, not in the intellect. Helm’s reading of Turretin’s “cannot not follow” as
a causal “must follow” rather than as the establishment of an order in the act
of choosing removes the will’s liberties of contradiction and contrariety and
reduces it to a necessary cause, determined to one effect. Neither can Helm’s
argument reconcile the terms found in Willard’s account: the will must follow
the practical intellect but the will also “is capable of acting or not acting, or
acting thus or contrarily.” If “follow” is causal in Helm’s sense, how can the will
either refuse to act or act contrarily?
Turretin has previously ruled out compulsion as interfering with freedom:
why would he merely rule out an external compulsion and allow for an inward
compulsion of the will by the intellect? The will does not, of course, elect
an object in utter isolation: Turretin argues both an ‘extrinsic’ determination
by divine providence and an ‘intrinsic’ or inward determination by the intellect, neither of which, however, removes “the nature of free will to determine itself.”33 We remind ourselves that a determination is a diacritical act:

31

32
33

Turretin, Institutio., X.ii.7: “quoad necessitatem rationalem determinationis ad unum ab
intellectu practico. Cum enim voluntas sit appetitus rationalis, ea est ejus natura, ut non
possit non sequi ultimum intellectus practici judicium; alias posset appetere malum sub
ratione mali, & adversari bonum sub ratione boni, quod est asystaton.”
Helm, “Turretin and Edwards on Compatibilism,” 35.
Turretin, Institutio., X.iii.7: “voluntas nunquam potest esse sine determinatione tam extrinseca a Dei providentia, quam intrenseca ab intellectus judicio, ut antea probatum fuit …

Journal of Reformed Theology 13 (2019) 267–286 Downloaded from Brill.com04/12/2022 03:11:06PM
via Calvin University and Seminary

280

muller

when the intellect makes a determination, it identifies an object for the will
as distinct from other objects; when the will determines itself it makes distinctions with regard to the object. As Franciscus Gomarus commented, the
act of will is free from necessity because “by itself [the will] is indeterminate” but it “determines itself by an intrinsic potency to elicit its own act.”34
Gomarus’s point references “the common Scholastic thesis that every free
action involves freedom with respect to elicited mental acts of willing or dissenting” and obliges the standard distinction between commanded acts and
elicited acts.35
There are two distinct ways in which early modern Reformed writers resolve
the issue of how the will receives the determination of its object by the intellect and still retains its freedom. Neither of them corresponds with Helm’s
approach. Both John Weemse and Edward Reynolds assume that the will follows and accepts the judgment of the intellect, but neither regards the priority
of the intellective determination as causal. Both also assume a fundamental
volitional exercise in desiring an object, in response to which the intellect provides a judgment.36 According to John Weemse, the intellect is a deliberative,
not an appetitive faculty. It provides the condition for the determination of the
will but does not cause the free choice: “the understanding is not the cause”;
rather, it provides “the condition without which [the will] could not chuse.”37
Edward Reynolds provides a similar perspective. He holds that the operation
of the will “presumes” a prior act of the intellect. The act of the understanding has been identified by the “Schoole-men” as “a Mandate or Command;

34

35

36

37

Nec obstat quod dicitur esse de ratione voluntatis liberae, ut seipsam determinet, quia
subordinata non pugnat: De ratione quidem voluntatis est, ut a se determinetur, sed non
a se sola; sic determinatio voluntatis, non excludit, sed supponit, determinationem Dei.”
Franciscus Gomarus, Disputatio theologica de libero arbitrio (Leiden: Joannes Patius, 1603),
iv: “liberum a necessitate est illud quod ex seipso est indeterminatum. i. ex intrinseca
potentia determinat seipsum ad actum suum eliciendum”; and see the discussion of
Gomarus by E. Dekker and M.A. Schouten in Reformed Thought on Freedom, 127–144; and
Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, 220–224.
Freddoso, “Introduction,” 25; and see Alan Donagan, “Thomas Aquinas on Human Action,”
in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg, and Eleonore Stump, eds. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy: From the Rediscovery of Aristotle to the Disintegration of Scholasticism, 1100–1600 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 650–
651.
John Weemse, The Portraiture of the Image of God in Man: In his three estates, of Creation,
Restauration, Glorification, in The Workes of Mr. Iohn. Weemse of Lathocker in Scotland, 4
vols. (London: T. Cotes for Iohn Bellamie, 1637), I.xvi (98); Edward Reynolds, A Treatise
of the Passions and Faculties of the Soul of Man with the Severall Dignities and Corruptions
Thereunto Belonging (London: F.N. for Robert Bostock and George Badger, 1650), 541–542.
Weemse, Portraiture, I.xvi (105).
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because it is a Precept, to which the Will ought to be obedient.”38 Reynolds’s use
of ‘ought’ is crucial. He continues:
it may not hence be concluded that the Understanding hath any Superiority, in regard of Domination over the Will, though it have Priority in
regard of Operation. The Power of the Understanding over the Will, is only
a Regulating and Directing, it is no constraining or Compulsive Power. For
the Will always is Domina suorum actuus, the Mistresse of her own Operation.39
The act of willing the object must follow the determination of the understanding—quite so, but the free choice of the will is not caused by the understanding.
It is the will that governs, moderates, and rules over all human actions, with the
judgment of the understanding providing “some precedent guiding Acts” that
are “proportioned to the Rules of right Reason” and identifying some means
to an end as more suitable than others.40 Arguably Turretin’s view is similar to
that of Weemse and Reynolds.
Other Reformed writers formulate the argument in a voluntaristic manner
with still more emphasis on the independence of the will, emphasizing its liberties of contradiction and contrariety. Gulielmus Bucanus provides a good
example of this pattern of definition in his Institutiones theologicae:
in the proper sense, Free Choice does not signify a faculty of doing good or
evil, or indeed a liberty of judgement, but rather the faculty of willing or
nilling something, or the free pleasure of the will, that follows the deliberation and consultation of the reason or the mind: or a free will, by which
the will either wills or does not will, chooses or refuses those things, that
are presented as objects by the mind or understanding: and not only of
ends but also of means.41

38
39
40
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Reynolds, Treatise of the Passions, 518.
Reynolds, Treatise of the Passions, 518.
Reynolds, Treatise of the Passions, 518, 537.
Gulielmus Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, seu locorum communium Christianae religionis, ex Dei verbo, et praestantissimorum theologorum orthodoxo consensu expositorum
(Bern: Iohannes & Isaias Le Preux, 1605), xi (109): “Itaque proprie Liberum Arbitrium non
significat facultatem vel bonum vel malum agendi, vel etiam iudicii libertatem, sed potius
facultatem volendi aut nolendi aliquid: seu liberum voluntatis placitum, quod rationis seu
mentis deliberationem sequitur, & consultationem: seu liberam voluntatem, qua quae a
mente vel intellectu obiecta sunt, voluntas vult aut non vult, eligit aut respuit: estque non
solum finium, sed etiam mediorum.”
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Bucanus restated the issue in his definition of liberum arbitrium after the
fall. He first indicates that it is the power or potency of the intellect to know
and discern good and evil—and the power or potency of the will to choose or
refuse either, yielding the definition,
with respect to the mind showing the object to be chosen or refused it is
called Arbitrium. It is Liberum with respect to the will which voluntarily
and of its own accord follows or refuses the judgement of the intellect.42
Virtually identical definitions are by Zacharias Ursinus and Lucas Trelcatius, Sr.
and Jr.43 All of these writers indicate a freedom of the will following the determination of an object by the intellect, understood specifically as a freedom to
choose or to reject that object, which is also the view presented more than a
century later by Samuel Willard.
Willard specifically identifies this capability of contraries and contradictories, as “indifference” and “the root of the liberty of the Will.” In his preceding
paragraph, Willard defined the point by identifying the root of freedom in the
lubentia or willingness to act, the nature of which, he noted, had been “disputed
in the Schools”: some had indicated that the willingness arises from an initial
indifference to will or not to will, others had identified the willingness with
spontaneity.44 Willard’s own preference is to hold “that freedom of will properly consist in a spontaneity,” which he defines further as the “liberty of chusing
or refusing.”45 Spontaneity, acting of one’s own accord, then, in Willard’s definition is not merely the uncoerced movement of will; it is also defined by
alternativity.
Willard continues, however, in the paragraph cited by Helm, by arguing that
there is an indifference, defined in scholastic terms as a simultas potentiae, in

42
43

44
45

Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, xviii (189).
Zacharias Ursinus, The Summe of Christian Religion, delivered by Zacharias Ursinus in his
Lectures upon the Catechism … Wherein are debated and resolved the questions of whatsoever points of moment which have beene or are controverted in divinity, trans. Henry Parry
(Oxford: Joseph Barnes, 1595), 137; Lucas Trelcatius, Sr., Loci communes s. s. theologiae.
Libri duo (Leiden: Ioannes Orlers & Ioannes Maire, 1614), viii (185); Lucas Trelcatius, Jr.,
Scholastica et methodica locorum communium s. theologiae institutio, didactice & elenctice in epitome explicata: in qua, veritas locorum communium, definitionis cuiusque, loci per
causas suas analysi asseritur: contraria vero argumenta, imprimis Bellarmini, generalium
solutionum appendice refutantur (London: John Bill, 1604), iii (203).
Willard, A Brief Reply ro Mr George Kieth, 14.
Samuel Willard, A Compleat Body of Divinity in Two Hundred and Fifty Expository Lectures
on the Assembly’s Shorter Catechism (Boston: B. Green and S. Kneeland, 1727), 185.
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the initial state of the will apart from and prior to act or operation, namely,
in actu primo. The movement of will from its primary, preoperative actuality
(actus primus) into its operative actuality (actus secundus) is marked by the
determination and choice or rejection of an object—specifically by a movement from indifference to determination: “in a free agent Indifferency may be
taken away, but as long as he still acts Spontaneously, he acts freely,” the spontaneity being defined by the “liberty of chusing or refusing.” There is no indifference in actu secundo, inasmuch as the act has been completed, the object
chosen or rejected. Accordingly, there is in the composite sense no potentia
simultatis, namely no potency of choosing and refusing the same object at the
same time and in the same way.
Willard recognizes, however, that the will is not only “capable of acting or
not acting, or acting thus or contrarily” but is also “capable of acting thus now,
and is afterwards capable of revoking that act.” The will cannot act and revoke
the act in the same moment, but having acted, it retains the capability of revoking the act. Helm appears—incorrectly—to identify the terms in sensu diviso
and in sensu composito with a movement from actus primus to actus secundus,
not recognizing that the terms provide a logical distinction regarding the status
of human potency or capability in the same moment and, therefore, can both
be used to explain the issue of potencies in the will in actu secundo.46 Even so,
Helm does not recognize that the primary actuality of the will does not disappear but remains present as the foundational formal identity of the will as
an indifferent reservoir of potencies that are the basis of the will’s liberties of
contradiction and contrariety. This presence, simultaneously, of an unactualized (and in the moment unactualizable) potency illustrates what I identified
as “root indifference” as Turretin comments, the will “can always be indifferent in actu primo and in the divided sense”—indeed, even in actu secundo, in
the divided sense, “the will when it determines itself, can still be indifferent in
itself.”47
There is a major difference here: in Helm’s, as in Edwards’s view of human
freedom, there is no indeterminacy. The will is causally determined from the
outset, whether by the identification of the object or by its own predispositions.
In the Reformed orthodox view, the will is indeterminate with regard its particular objects in its primary state or actuality, prior to choice. The entire thrust of
the argument is to understand how the will moves from indeterminacy to deter46
47

Helm, “Francis Turretin and Jonathan Edwards on Compatibilism,” 352–353.
Turretin, Institutio, VI.v.11: “potest tamen semper esse indifferens in actu primo & in sensu
diviso,” the reason being that “ipsa voluntas, quando seipsam determinat, potest tamen
esse in se indifferens.” Cf. further, Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, 287–288.
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mination. In other words, in Helm’s view of human freedom, as in Edwards’s,
there is no root or underlying indifference in the will. It is always predisposed to
act in a particular way in relation to a particular object and particular circumstances. In the older Reformed view, however, the nature of free choice is such
that intellect and will act together to move from indifference to the determination of an object, with liberties of contradiction and contrariety remaining in
the will. This does not mean that Reformed thought on freedom allows for no
hindrances, inclinations, and dispositions, that can guide, delimit, and to some
extent direct human willing, but none of these acts as causes necessitating the
will, none compel the will. The will remains free, having an “intrinsic potency
to elicit its own act.”
Helm’s concluding comment that “as a potency into actuality à la Turretin
is necessitated by the intellect, so ipso facto a potency to the opposite is rendered inoperable” assumes a causal necessity where there is none, misses the
meaning of ‘potency’ as a resident capacity, fails to distinguish between different kinds of necessity, and misunderstands what it means for the will to follow
the intellect. The intellect is not an engine that necessitates the actualization
of potencies by the will.
Helm’s claim that certain of the phrases used in describing the Reformed
orthodox position, notably, ‘genuine liberty,’ ‘contingency,’ and ‘could have
done otherwise,’ are “by current standards underdescribed” begs the question.
The phrase ‘could have done otherwise’ is not mine, but is a standard rendering
of the Latin usage, potest aliter se habere, typical of medieval and early modern
scholastic discourse. The phrase indicates, quite precisely, a contingency that,
given the simultaneously present resident capabilities (potencies) of the will,
a person is capable of choosing or refusing an object or of choosing another
object, with the will determining its own act. To claim, moreover, that such language has a parallel in an Edwardsian identification of contingency with “the
belief in an agent’s mind that he could have done otherwise had other reasons
to act thusly been uppermost” is hardly credible.48 The Reformed orthodox
identify an actual, genuine contingency in the real order of things—Helm here
identifies a “belief,” an imagined or purely epistemic contingency. Such willing may be spontaneous or uncoerced, but in the older Reformed view it is not
(genuinely) free.
‘Genuine liberty,’ ‘genuine contingency,’ and ‘genuine alternativity,’ therefore, are also not underdescribed. The problem is not underdescription but a
lack of correlation between traditional Reformed argumentation and modern
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compatibilism. The terms rather accurately describe the Reformed orthodox
assumption that the will itself has the capacity to choose or refuse or to choose
something other—quite in contrast to the compatibilist assumption, in this
case Edwards’s assumption, that the mind has mistakenly interpreted the spontaneity of the will as a capacity in the moment to do otherwise. In the absence
of a capacity to achieve a different effect or result, there is no “genuine” contingency or alternativity.

4

A Concluding Note on Synchronic Contingency and Simultaneity of
Potencies

Helm indicates that “one of the great strengths of Muller’s book” is the case
that I make against synchronic contingency but also suggests that I haven’t
“shucked off synchronicity and simultaneity,”49 when in fact I have not made
a case against synchronic contingency or expressed any interest in disposing
of the issue of simultaneity: my argument, at least as I thought I presented
it, was not that concept of ‘synchronic contingency’ or ‘simultaneous contingency,’ was problematic but that the term ‘simultaneity of potency,’ as resident
in the historical sources, offered a better way of characterizing the early modern
Reformed assumptions concerning human willing and choosing. The reason
for my preference, moreover, is not merely that the term ‘synchronic’ or ‘simultaneous contingency’ does not appear in the historical sources, but that the
sources themselves were focused not on potentially alternative, simultaneous,
or synchronous contingencies, but on actually resident simultaneous potencies
in the will.
My preference for simultas potentiae over synchronic contingency rests,
moreover, on the issue that, in the act of human willing, one potency is actualized, bringing about a contingent effect while the contrary potency remains (in
the divided sense) as a potency, incapable of being actualized. In other words,
there are multiple potencies existing simultaneously, but there is (and can be)
only a single contingency that is actualized. There is a simultaneity or synchronicity of potencies, but no simultaneity or synchronicity of contingencies
not, at least, when human freedom is being considered as such.
If, then, simultaneity of potency or potencies is the term properly used to
describe the capabilities of a free will in producing a contingent effect, there
remains a sense in which synchronic or simultaneous contingency can be used

49
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to identify the larger framework of divine and human willing in which a concurrent divine motion is required at the primary level of causality in order for
any motion, including free acts of the will, to occur at the secondary level.
Still, in my view, the preferable terminology is in the documents themselves,
where there is reference to contingentia, libertas, concursus, and praemotio
physica. Once the divine concurrence or premotion is considered together
with the human act of willing, there are two contingencies—the divine act of
will that could have been otherwise and the human act that also could have
been otherwise, together yielding by a necessity of the consequence the one
effect that, accordingly, could have been otherwise. The divine willing, as firstorder causality, is metaphysically prior to all second-order or finite movements,
including human willing. This priority, however, is a priority in nature but not in
time: God, as first cause, renders second-order causes and wills capable of causing and willing, even as he renders them capable of being. This understanding
of two levels of causality, the higher both rendering the lower or secondary
order possible and actively bringing about necessities, contingencies, and free
acts that are also brought about by finite agents acting according to their own
natures, is a consistent understanding throughout both the late medieval and
the early modern eras—and it is neither libertarian not compatibilist. It is
certainly within Helm’s prerogative to declare that these views are “false” theologically or philosophically—but the documents belie his claim that such views
are nonexistent among the Reformed orthodox.
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